Skip to main content
Property CSS Value
height-card-lg

Steve Adams, MPH

Steve Adams, MPH

 
 

Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director
Strategic National Stockpile
Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Steve Adams, MPH

Steven A. Adams is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Center for the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Over the past 30 years, Adams has held various leadership roles in contingency response programs and public health initiatives, ranging from HIV field epidemiology to managing studies to determine the health impacts to civilians from Cold War-era nuclear weapons production.

He has represented the HHS Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as an expert in emergency response and supply chain management, collaborating with international agencies and private sector partners to improve the supply chain for medical materials required to address chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-yield explosive threats, aid humanitarian assistance missions, and combat global pandemics.

As part of the Global Health Security Agenda, he led efforts to foster self-sufficiency by providing technical assistance to help many high priority developing countries create and implement their own national medical logistics plans. In addition to his technical and programmatic leadership, Adams has overseen numerous large-scale public health emergency responses, including the SNS responses to global pandemics and the U.S. mpox outbreak, and has led rapid field deployment teams.

Adams holds a Master of Public Health degree from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and a program certificate from Harvard's National Preparedness Leadership Initiative. 
 


Contact Us

For further questions or information about the Strategic National Stockpile, please email us at sns.ops@hhs.gov

Stockpile Responses

Stockpile Responses

 

History

The National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was created in 1999 to ensure the nation's readiness against potential agents of bioterrorism like botulism, anthrax, smallpox, plague, viral hemorrhagic fevers, and tularemia. The mission was to assemble large quantities of essential medical supplies that could be delivered to states and communities during the emergency within 12 hours of the federal decision to use the stockpile.

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks prompted federal legislation and directives to strengthen public health emergency readiness. In 2003, the National Pharmaceutical Stockpile was renamed Strategic National Stockpile. 
 

The stockpile has supported more than 65 public health emergency responses including floods, hurricanes, and influenza pandemics. It has also supported various small-scale deployments for the treatment of individuals with life-threatening infectious diseases like anthrax, smallpox, and botulism. The SNS also trains about 4,000 state and local responders annually on receiving and distributing stockpiled medicines and supplies. 
 

2024 –2025 H5N1 Bird Flu 
 

  • Provided a range of personal protective equipment (PPE) to jurisdictions with a demonstrated need

  • Made oseltamivir (Tamiflu) available to jurisdictions without their own stockpiles to treat symptomatic persons with confirmed or suspected exposure

2022-2025 – Monkeypox

  • Supported the National Monkeypox Vaccine Strategy and a comprehensive government public health response

  • Deployed vaccines and therapeutics to states and major metropolitan areas to support communities affected by monkeypox

  • Shipped over 1 million vials of the JYNNEOS vaccine and over 41,000 treatment courses of TPOXX, TEMBEXA, and VIG-IV

2020-2023 – COVID-19

  • Shipped 27,535 tons of cargo: 748 flights / 5,745 trucks

  • Assigned over 200 staffers to the HHS Special Operations Center

  • Engaged 411 private industry partners to obtain & deliver supplies

  • Supported the National Vaccination Campaign

  • Provided supplies for 1.32 billion doses of vaccines, booster doses, & epinephrine

  • Expanded and enhanced SNS capabilities to respond to emerging infectious disease

  • Provided critical PPE & medical supplies to emergency intake sites for migrants and refugees

2019 – Hurricane Dorian

  • Deployed medical supplies to support responders with ASPR's National Disaster Medical System

  • Deployed liaisons to the HHS Secretary's Operations Center

  • Assigned approximately 50 staffers to the SNS operations center 
     

2017 – Zika & Hurricanes Harvey, Irma & Maria

  • Arrived within 48 hours of deployment orders

  • Engaged over 120 SNS personnel over the course of these responses

  • Purchased & deployed $4.5 million in supplies (26 flights, 347 tons of cargo)

  • Coordinated with HHS Secretary's Operation Center & Incident Response Coordination Team

  • Established a 10,000 sq ft medical distribution center

  • Deployed vaccines & medical supplies to the USVI & Puerto Rico

  • Coordinated delivery of refrigerators, 42,000 MREs, and 177,000 bottles of water 
     

2016 – Zika

  • Collaborated with the CDC Foundation to source prevention products and educational materials

  • Rapidly assembled & delivered approximately 31,000 Zika Prevention Kits

  • Initiated contracts for mosquito control efforts 
     

2015 – Botulism Outbreak

  • Provided Botulism Antitoxin Heptavalent to Ohio

2014-2015 – Ebola Virus 

  • Deployed 64 staff members to support response at CDC Emergency Operations Center, 5 U.S. airports, and several countries in Western Africa

  • Coordinated between Ebola Treatment Centers and commercial suppliers

  • Established a small stockpile of PPE to meet short-term needs 
     

2012 – Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy 

  • Deployed FMS to New Jersey and New York & Commissioned Corps Officers to staff the FMS

  • Deployed FMS to Louisiana 
     

2011 – Hurricane Irene 

  • Deployed FMS and FMS Strike Teams

2010 – North Dakota Flooding and Hurricane Alex

  • Deployed FMS and FMS Strike Teams 
     

2009 – H1N1 Pandemic Influenza and North Dakota Flooding

  • Shipped influenza antiviral medications to 62 areas in 7 days

  • Responded to over 1,300 requests for Peramivir IV

  • Deployed FMS to North Dakota 
     

2008 – Hurricanes Gustav and Ike

  • Deployed approximately 6,000 beds to five states (Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, & Texas) in a 30-day period

2005 – Hurricanes Katrina and Rita

In response to requests from Louisiana and Mississippi related to Hurricane Katrina, the stockpile:

  • Sent 3,500 FMS beds & FMS Strike Teams

  • Delivered over 130,000 vaccines & 30,000 vials of insulin

  • Provided pain medications & re-hydration fluids

  • Shipped 28 ventilator kits

2001 – World Trade Center and Anthrax Attacks

  • Deployed pharmaceuticals and medical supplies to New York City within 7 hours on September 11, 2001

  • Delivered anthrax countermeasures to over 50 sites across the nation within 5 hours of threat identification 

     


Contact Us

For further questions or information about the Strategic National Stockpile, please email us at sns.ops@hhs.gov

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal Protective Equipment

Health care workers rely on personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves, surgical/face masks, N95 respirators, face shields, goggles, gowns, and coveralls to safeguard themselves and their patients against the spread of infectious disease or illness. HHS/ASPR's Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) is the nation's largest repository of emergency medical and pandemic response supplies to ensure that health care workers are equipped with the PPE they need to slow the spread of infection. When states, tribal nations, large metropolitan areas and territories cannot meet their PPE needs from their own stockpiles or from the commercial market, they can request SNS assets, specifically PPE for use by health care workers.

Contact Information

For questions on PPE, please contact the SNS Operations Center at sns.ops@hhs.gov.

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Emergency Preparedness and Response

Strategic National Stockpile

The Strategic National Stockpile's role is to supplement state and local medical supplies and equipment during public health emergencies. The supplies, medicines, and devices for lifesaving care contained in the stockpile can be used as a short-term, stopgap buffer when the immediate supply of these materials may not be available or sufficient.

Mpox Counter-measures

monkey pox under a microscope
 

Influenza Counter-measures

a line of parker tractor trailers
 

Response History

a line of parker tractor trailers
 

Requesting SNS Assets

forklift in a warehouse moving a pallet of boxes
 

Inventory Management and Tracking System

workers standing over a pallet of boxes doing inventory
 

Contact Us

For further questions or information about the Strategic National Stockpile, please email us at sns.ops@hhs.gov

Emergency Contacts to Request Assistance

HHS Secretary's Operations Center at 202-619-7800 
CDC Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100

Requesting SNS Assets

Requesting SNS Assets

Who can request SNS assets

In the face of a public health threat, state, tribal, local or territorial health officials may request federal assistance for emergency medical countermeasures from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS). Requests can come from a governor or a governor's designee or senior health officials in a state, tribal entity, directly funded city, or territory. Cities funded through the Public Health Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement include Chicago, Los Angeles, New York City and Washington, D.C. In addition, tribal nations and Urban Indian Organizations have defined pathways to access stockpiled medical countermeasures from the SNS.

What can they request

Jurisdictional health officials can request support for accessing medical countermeasures, including antibiotics, antitoxins, antidotes, and vaccines, as well as supplemental medical supplies and equipment. Needed products and supplies may be available direct from the SNS inventory or they may be procured or quickly made available from commercial supplies or other federal agencies.

How to make a request

When a need arises, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary's Operatio ns Center (SOC) is the initial contact for requesting emergency supplies. The SOC is staffed by the Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and 365 days a year.

A request may also come through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Emergency Operations Center, particularly for incidents that require clinical consultation. CDC's operations center is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and 365 days a year and can coordinate with the SOC to begin the request process, especially for Category A threats like anthrax or smallpox that require rapid response.

Emergency Contacts to Request Assistance

HHS Secretary's Operations Center at 202-619-7800
CDC Emergency Operations Center at 770-488-7100

What to expect once a request is made

When a request for support is received, ASPR watch officers will first gather critical information. Once that happens, coordination will begin immediately between the watch officers, the requesting officials, SNS leadership, subject matter experts (SMEs), ASPR regional staff and other federal agencies. Together, officials will either schedule a conference call with all involved parties (generally to occur within 15 minutes of the request being received) or directly connect the requestor with appropriate technical experts. These SMEs will discuss the request and confirm the nature of the public health threat, any human impacts already observed, the anticipated public health response, and the specific materiel requested. Requesting officials should be prepared to provide information on:

  • Location of the event or incident;

  • Nature of the threat, and any known human impact (morbidity or mortality), if known;

  • Size and type of population potentially affected; and

  • Summary of events leading up to the threat discovery

Depending on the scale and nature of the threat and whether a deployment from the SNS is needed, coordinating information may include: desired delivery locations and individual points of contact with mobile phone numbers for each delivery location; the jurisdiction's site staffing timeline and ability to receive and store product; whether there is security staffing and any potential security threats; availability of a Drug Enforcement Agency registrant; and any local transportation challenges.

You can also expect ASPR's Regional Emergency Coordinators (RECs) assigned to each of the HHS regions throughout the country to further help identify needs and assist with resolution.

Factors considered for deployment

While no two requests are exactly alike, factors that ASPR considers when a request is made include: available resources at the state and local levels, commercial availability, similar requests from other jurisdictions, and SNS inventory and available funding if new acquisitions are needed.

ASPR strives to satisfy all requests for support from jurisdictions – both through direct product deployment and further technical assistance. Satisfying a request might not always result in deploying product from the SNS. ASPR can also assist in sourcing scarce products throughout the regions, navigating the commercial supply chain, and making further connections across ASPR and the federal government.

Individual or small-scale requests

Sometimes an isolated, time-critical incident, such as an individual patient with naturally occurring anthrax or botulism may occur, and the SNS is the only source for critical, life-saving medical countermeasures. These requests may originate from a clinician contacting CDC for consultation, from a notification by a jurisdictional public health official, or from an ASPR regional emergency coordinator assisting the jurisdiction with the request process. Regardless of how a request for assistance originates, ASPR and CDC work closely together to ensure a streamlined process, especially in time-sensitive situations.

IBx Connect Factors for Succ​ess

IBx Connect Factors for Succ​ess

Six Ways to Make the Most of your IBx Connect Meeting

If you or your company are developing innovative solutions or have one available on the market that address vulnerabilities in our nation's public health and medical supply chains, including advanced manufacturing of drug substances and drug products, supply chain optimization (through data analytics, process analysis, modeling, business intelligence, advanced planning techniques), PPE manufacturing, vaccine manufacturing, and testing and diagnostic devices, you can get insights into potential paths forward for your product and strategic advice from ASPR via IBx Connect.

A woman talks during an online meeting

Here are six things you can do to make the most of your IBx Connect meeting:

Factor 1: Know How Your Product Could Integrate with ASPR's Priorities

Be ready to discuss ways that your product addresses supply chain vulnerabilities or how your product fits into the IBx Areas of Interest.

Factor 2: Explain How Your Product Is Unique

Be ready to explain how your product is different from other products that are already available in the commercial marketplace.

Factor 3: Be Ready to Discuss Challenges Associated with Your Product or Technology

During your IBx Connect meeting, be prepared to discuss your company's techniques and strategies for addressing technical and regulatory challenges.

Factor 4: Focus on Data

Be prepared to highlight any data you have gathered that demonstrates the viability of your idea. By providing ASPR with clear information at the beginning of the process, we can better help you identify gaps and analyze areas of your proposal that need further consideration.

Factor 5: Consider Your Path to Regulatory Approval

If your final goal is to develop a product or technology that is approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, be prepared to discuss your plan to address the regulatory pathway for your product. Don't worry about having all of the answers up front, but be ready to demonstrate that you have seriously considered this critical aspect of product development.

Factor 6: Bring Your Questions

IBx Connect can also serve as an opportunity to talk about challenges with subject matter experts about opportunities to further develop your product or technology.

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy Implementation Plan 2024

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy Implementation Plan 2024

Recommendations produced by the PHEMCE are guided by the PHEMCE Strategy and Implementation Plan (SIP). The SIP describes the PHEMCE's goals and objectives to improve the nation's medical countermeasure (MCM) preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats, including pandemic influenza and other emerging infectious diseases (EIDs).

Table of Contents

  1. Executive Summary

  2. Introduction

  3. PHEMCE Structure and Function

  4. Recent Accomplishments

  5. 2024 PHEMCE Goals

  6. Conclusion

  7. Appendix: PHEMCE High-Priority Threats

Long Descriptions for Figures

Long Descriptions for Figures

Healthcare and Public Health Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guide 
 

Figure 1: Notional Information and Decision Flows within an Organization 

Figure 2 describes a common flow of information and decisions at the following levels within an organization:

  • Executive

  • Business/Process

  • Implementation/Operations

The executive level communicates the mission priorities, available resources, and overall risk tolerance to the business/process level. The business/process level uses the information as inputs into the risk management process, and then collaborates with the implementation/operations level to communicate business needs and create a Profile. The implementation/operations level communicates the Profile implementation progress to the business/process level. The business/process level uses this information to perform an impact assessment. Business/process level management reports the outcomes of that impact assessment to the executive level to inform the organization's overall risk management process and to the implementation/operations level for awareness of business impact. 

Figure 2: Healthcare Implementation Process 

The graphic illustrates how an organization could use the Framework to create a new cybersecurity program or improve an existing program. These steps should be repeated as necessary to continuously improve cybersecurity. 

  • Step 1: Prioritize and Scope

  • Step 2: Orient 

  • Step 3: Create Target Profile 

  • Step 4: Conduct Risk Assessment

  • Step 5: Create Current Profile

  • Step 6: Determine, Analyze and Prioritize Gaps

For more information, please refer to pages 14-15 of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. 
Figure 4: Relating Cybersecurity Risk to Other Forms of Business Risk 
 

Risk Types 
 
Strategic Risk: 
Organizational strategies may not support business objectives 
 
Operations Risk: 
Degradation of day-to-day operations (typically related to cash flow)
Reporting Risk: 
Adverse Impact on credit & cash management 
 
Compliance Risk: 
Adverse outcomes of regulatory or contractual non-compliance 
 
Cybersecurity Risk:

Compromise or unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information and related concerns 
 

(e.g., potential risk to planned M&A or divestment)(e.g., potential risk to continuity of operations) 
 
(e.g., potential risk to accuracy of financial reporting.) 
 
(e.g., potential risk of fines & penalties.) 
 


Figure 5: Example NIST Cybersecurity Framework Scorecard 

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework Scored is organized by function, category and level of compliance. 

Figure 6: Generic Implementation Process 

  • Step 1: Prioritize and Scope

  • Step 2: Orient 

  • Step 3: Create Target Profile 

  • Step 4: Conduct Risk Assessment

  • Step 5: Create Target Profile

  • Step 6: Determine, Analyze and Prioritize Gaps

  • Step 7: Implement Action Plan 

HPH Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guide

HPH Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guide

HPH Sector Cybersecurity Framework Implementation Guide

Version 2
March 2023

 

Table of Contents

Tables and Figures

Long Descriptions for Images and Figures

Long Descriptions for Images and Figures

Medical Surge Capacity and Capabilities (MSCC)

MSCC Project Scope Figure

Graphic shows the Public health and medical response management across the intergovernmental and public-private divides. The graphic shows a vertical relationship linking the individual healthcare organization to the federal response. The relationship, from the ground up, shows these levels: individual healthcare organization response, healthcare coalition response, local jurisdiction response, state response, interstate regional response, and finally federal response.

Figure 1-1: Management System for Reaching MSCC Objectives

Figure 1-1 shows the management system for reaching MSCC objectives. During a medical surge event, an HCO must be able to transition from a baseline medical capacity and capability using the MSCC management system to an incident medical surge capacity and capability. Once the medical surge event is complete, the HCO can then utilize the same MSCC management system to transition back to its baseline capacity and capability.

Figure 1-2: MSCC Management Organization Strategy

Figure 1-2 shows the six-tier construct depicting the various levels of public health and medical asset management during response to mass casualty and/or mass effect incidents. Tier 1 is the healthcare asset management (emergency management program and emergency operations plan using incident command). Tier 2 is the healthcare coalition in which multiple HCOs cooperate in information sharing, cooperative planning, and mutual aide).

Figure 1-3: Incident Command System

Figure 1-3 shows the Five functional areas of the ICS: Command, operations, logistics, planning, and admin/finance. The following are the primary responsibilities of each function area. Command defines the incident goals and operational period objectives and includes incident commander, safety officer, public information officer, senior liaison, and senior advisors. Operations establishes strategy or methodology and specific tactics or actions to accomplish the goals and objectives. Operations also coordinates and executes strategy and tactics to achieve response objectives. Logistics supports command and operation sin their use of personnel, supplies, and equipment and performs technical activities required to maintain the function of operational facilities and processes. Planning coordinates support activities for incident planning as well as contingency, long-range, and demobilization planning. Planning also supports command and operations in processing incident information and coordinates the information activities across the response system. Finally, admin/finance supports command and operations with administrative issues as well as tracking and processing incident expenses. Admin/finance also covers such issues as licensure requirements, regulatory compliance, and financial accounting.

Figure 1-4: Types of Demands Encountered in Incident Response

Figure 1-4 shows the two sets of simultaneous demands that are encountered during an incident response: "hazard-generated demands" and "response-generated demands". Hazard-generated demands are: warning, pre-impact preparations, search and rescue, care of injured and dead, welfare needs, restoration of essential services, protection against continuing threat, and community order. Response-generated demands are: communications, continuing assessment of situation, mobilization and utilization of resources, coordination, and exercise of authority.

Figure 1-5: Basic Presentation of a Planning Cycle

Figure 1-5 shows the basic presentation of a planning cycle. The graphic moves clockwise starting from the upper-right. First stage is to hold a planning meeting to develop strategy, tactics, and assignments to accomplish the objectives. During this stage, information processing and supportive plans are developed. Next stage is to prepare and approve an Incident Action Plan (IAP). Upon approval, this begins the operational period. Next stage is to hold an operational briefing to operations leaders about the IAP. Next stage is to execute the IAP and initiate planning for the next operational period. Next stage is to assess progress using measures of effectiveness. Final stage is to hold a management meeting to evaluate and revise incident objectives. The management meeting denotes the start point for subsequent incident planning cycles. The management meeting also includes information processing and supportive plans development.

Figure 1-6: Relationship of UC and the MACS that provide emergency management operations support to the UC.

Figure 1-6 shows the basic presentation of a planning cycle. The graphic moves clockwise starting from the upper-right. First stage is to hold a planning meeting to develop strategy, tactics, and assignments to accomplish the objectives. During this stage, information processing and supportive plans are developed. Next stage is to prepare and approve an Incident Action Plan (IAP). Upon approval, this begins the operational period. Next stage is to hold an operational briefing to operations leaders about the IAP. Next stage is to execute the IAP and initiate planning for the next operational period. Next stage is to assess progress using measures of effectiveness. Final stage is to hold a management meeting to evaluate and revise incident objectives. The management meeting denotes the start point for subsequent incident planning cycles. The management meeting also includes information processing and supportive plans development.

Figure 1-7: Common types of Multiagency Coordination Groups and Centers

Figure 1-7 shows the common types of multiagency coordination groups and centers. The common types of coordination groups are: Crisis action teams, policy committees, MAC group, joint field office coordination group and incident management planning team. The Common types of coordination centers are: emergency operations centers, joint operations center, joint filed office, joint information center, regional response coordination center, national response coordination center and national operations center.

Figure 1-8: Stages of Incident Response

Figure 1-8 shows the different stages of incident response: incident recognition, notification/activation, mobilization, incident operations, demobilization, and transition to recovery. Proactive management through the Planning cycle occurs during the final three stages.

Figure 1-9: Coordination of Planning Activities

Figure 1-9 shows the coordination of planning activities between the state and jurisdiction and that of the federal government. State and jurisdiction have concurrent planning cycles and operational periods across the stages of defining goals and objectives, defining strategy, priorities and major tactics and completing the incident action plan prior to the beginning of a new operational period. The federal government support is slightly staggered from the state and jurisdictions so that they start slightly after and end after state and jurisdictions to allow for information exchange between stages. After all stages, a formal media briefing is coordinated to release incident details in a way that ensures responders are informed first and that there is a consistent message.

Figure 2-0: Management of Individual Healthcare Assets (Tier 1)

Image shows figure 1-2: MSCC Management Organization Strategy's six-tier construct depicting the various levels of public health and medical asset management during response to mass casualty and/or mass effect incidents. Emphasis is put on the lowest level, Tier 1: Healthcare asset management (EMP and EOP using incident command).

Figure 2-1:Organization of the National Response Plan

Figure 2-1 shows the organization of the Emergency Operations Plan from Healthcare Organizations as depicted in the national response plan from the Department of Homeland Security. The organization of the plan has five steps. First, is the Base Plan, consisting of concepts of operations, coordinating structure, roles and responsibilities, definitions, etc. The next step is the emergency support function annexes consisting of groups� capabilities and resources into function that are most likely needed during an incident (e.g. transportation, firefighting, mass care, etc. Next, is Support Annexes, which describes common processes and specific administrative requirements (e.g. public affairs, financial management, worker safety and health issues, etc.). Fourth is incident annexes, which outline procedures, roles and responsibilities for specific contingencies (e.g. terrorism, catastrophic, radiological, etc). Last, is Appendices, made up of glossary, acronyms, authorities, and compendium of national interagency plans.

Figure 3-0: Management of Individual Healthcare Assets (Tier 1)

Image shows figure 1-2: MSCC Management Organization Strategy's six-tier construct depicting the various levels of public health and medical asset management during response to mass casualty and/or mass effect incidents. Emphasis is put on Tier 2: Healthcare "coalition" (info sharing, cooperative planning, mutual aid.

Figure 3-1. Tier 2 Coalition Action Plan

Figure 3-1 shows the clearinghouse process for creating a coalition incident action plan from disaggregated HCO IAPs submitted. All individual IAPs from the Healthcare Organizations are feed into the coalition clearinghouse function which receives the data from the HCOs, collates them, and returns the aggregate data to the HCOs. The output, the HCO coalition IAP, is then sent on to the Jurisdiction Incident Management.

Figure 4-0: Jurisdiction Incident Management (Tier 3)

Image shows figure 1-2: MSCC Management Organization Strategy's six-tier construct depicting the various levels of public health and medical asset management during response to mass casualty and/or mass effect incidents. Emphasis is put on the Tier 3: Jurisdiction incident management (medical ICS and emergency support - EOC).

Figure 4-1: Generic Management Structure for Jurisdictional Response

Figure 4-1 shows the generic management structure for Jurisdiction response to emergency event. The following is the hierarchical structure that reports up and feeds into the Unified Command. At the bottom, are the five sections: Operations, logistics, planning, and Administration/Finance. These sections report up to the Senior Liaison. The Senior Liaison reports up to the Safety Team which is responsible for the traditional safety role, health/prevention medicine, and security. Next is the Safety Information Officer. Following the Safety Information Officer are the Senior Advisors which may include pre-selected experts representing the private medical community. The senior advisors feed directly into the Unified Command, which consists of Fire/EMS, Law Enforcement, Public Health, Human services, and others as indicated (e.g. public works, schools, etc.). The Unified Command also coordinates Regional and State Management. Also feeding the Unified command is the Multiagency coordination Center (MACC), which is usually local EOC. The MACC's policy is guided by the Multiagency Coordination Group (MAC Group), which has the senior political authority for jurisdiction.

Figure 4-3. EOC Incident Support in Traditional Emergency Response

Figure 4-3 shows the Incident Support that the Emergency Operations Center provides during a traditional emergency response. Within the Jurisdiction area, the EOC integrates political leaders with the Unified Command. The EOC also supports the UC on needs not met through available assets or mutual aid in support of the Incident Management Post at the incident itself. The EOC also addresses incident-related issues outside the focus of the US (e.g. traffic disruptions). Finally, the EOC coordinates support with other levels of government (e.g. federal, regional, state) that fall out side the actual jurisdiction area.

Figure 5-0: Jurisdiction Incident Management

Image shows figure 1-2: MSCC Management Organization Strategy's six-tier construct depicting the various levels of public health and medical asset management during response to mass casualty and/or mass effect incidents. Emphasis is put on Tier 4: State response and coordination of intrastate jurisdictions (management coordination and support to jurisdictions).

Figure 5-1. Generic SEMS Management Structure

Figure 5-1 shows the generic Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) structure. The structure is a 5 level hierarchy starting from the ground up. The ground level is the "Field Response", emergency responders carrying out tactical decisions and activities in direct response to a threat. The Field Response requires the use of ICS functions. Above the Field Response is the "Local Government". Local Government includes cities, counties, and special districts and manages and coordinates overall emergency response and recovery activities in their jurisdictions. Above local government is the "Operational Area" which encompasses the county and all political subdivisions in the county, including special districts. The Operational area manages and coordinates information, resources and priorities among local governments and serves as the coordination and communications link between local and regional levels. Above the operational area is the "Regional Level" which manages and coordinates resources among operational areas. The Region Level also coordinates information sharing between operational areas and the State level and oversees State support for emergency response activates in the region. Last, at the top of the hierarchy, is the "State Level" which manages State resources to meet emergency needs of other levels and coordinates mutual aid among regions and between regional and State levels. Finally, the State Level serves as communication link between the State and the Federal response system.


Subscribe to USWDS Height Card Large (240px)