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2023 HHS Screening Framework Guidance for Providers and Users of Synthetic Nucleic Acids

2023 HHS Screening Framework Guidance for Providers and Users of Synthetic Nucleic Acids

S3: Science Safety Security

The 2023 HHS Screening Framework Guidance for Providers and Users of Synthetic Nucleic Acids was drafted to address advances in synthetic biology that have occurred since the HHS Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA was first issued in 2010. This guidance sets forth recommended baseline standards for the gene and genome synthesis industry (providers) and for manufacturers of benchtop nucleic acid synthesis devices. It also details best practices for customers of synthetic nucleic acids (i.e., institutions, principal users, end users, and third-party vendors) regarding screening orders for sequences of concern and for responsibly handling the use and transfer of synthetic nucleic acids containing sequences of concern. In addition, this guidance seeks to encourage best practices to address biosecurity concerns associated with the potential misuse of synthetic nucleic acids to bypass existing regulatory controls.

This guidance has several significant updates from the 2010 guidance that address advances in synthetic biology. The 2010 guidance limited its recommendations to providers of synthetic double-stranded DNA and recommended that they screen orders to detect 200 base pair or longer sequences that are unique to regulated agents (i.e., Biological Select Agent or Toxin or Commerce Control List agents). The revised guidance seeks to minimize risks posed by advances in biotechnology and changes in the commercial landscape for synthetic nucleic acids by expanding the scope of its recommendations to include:

  • A definition of Sequences of Concern (SOCs) that includes all sequences that contribute to pathogenicity or toxicity, whether from regulated or unregulated agents;

  • Best practices for all entities involved in the synthesis, use, and transfer of nucleic acids containing SOCs (i.e., providers and customers);

  • Best practices for manufacturers of benchtop nucleic acid synthesis equipment and institutions where they are used;

  • Recommendations for screening orders over a smaller screening window – 50 nucleotides; and

  • Recommendations for screening orders of all types of synthetic nucleic acid orders (i.e., single- and double-stranded forms of DNA and RNA).

To address concerns associated with advances in synthetic biology that have emerged since 2010, the guidance recommends an expanded definition of SOCs. This definition includes all sequences that contribute to pathogenicity or toxicity, whether from regulated agents (i.e., Biological Select Agent or Toxin or Commerce Control List agents) or unregulated agents – as soon as it is practical to do so. To ensure that synthetic genetic materials containing SOCs are distributed and used responsibly, the guidance also recommends that customers (i.e., principal users and end users) and providers and third-party vendors verify the legitimacy of each recipient of nucleic acids containing SOCs – and that all parties maintain records of SOC transfers. The guidance also recommends that manufacturers of benchtop nucleic acid synthesis equipment identify SOCs in nucleic acids prior to their synthesis and verify the legitimacy of their customers.

This Companion Guide to the HHS Screening Framework includes additional explanations and potential scenarios that are intended to assist customers, providers, and manufacturers in implementing the recommendations in the guidance, and the FAQ answers commonly asked questions
 

2024 OSTP Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening

2024 OSTP Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening

 

S3: Science Safety Security

Update: Update: In compliance with the Executive Order on "Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research" issued on May 5, 2025, federal departments and agencies will revise or replace the 2024 Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening. This page will be updated once the new framework is available.

The White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) released the Framework for Nucleic Acid Synthesis Screening on April 29, 2024. This Framework established requirements – as a condition of receiving U.S. governmental life sciences research funding – that synthetic nucleic acids, and benchtop devices capable of synthesizing them, are only procured from providers and manufacturers that comply with the requirements of the Framework.

These screening requirements built on the recommendations in the 2023 HHS Screening Framework Guidance for Providers and Users of Synthetic Nucleic Acids. Both documents were focused on preventing access to synthetic genetic materials containing SOCs by individuals without a legitimate need for them.

High Consequence Research Oversight

High Consequence Research Oversight

S3: Science Safety Security

Update: In compliance with the Executive Order on Improving the Safety and Security of Biological Research issued on May 5, 2025, federal departments and agencies will revise or replace the 2024 United States Government Policy for Oversight of Dual Use Research of Concern and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential. This page will be updated once the revised policy is available.

Research involving biological agents and toxins is essential to the scientific advances that underpin improvements in national and global health and safety. However, there are biosafety and biosecurity risks associated with undertaking such research that are carefully considered and appropriately mitigated in order to safely realize these benefits. The U.S. government has existing statutes, regulations, policies, and guidelines that address potential biosafety and biosecurity risks, including those associated with research oversight and management. Together, these authorities, policies, and guidelines provide a foundation for ensuring that scientific research is conducted safely and securely.

Research oversight is a critical component of effective biosafety and biosecurity practices and the responsible conduct of research involving biological agents and toxins. The intent of research oversight programs is to increase the awareness of researchers, research institutions, and federal funding agencies about the biosafety and biosecurity concerns associated with certain types of research and to ensure that appropriate risk mitigation measures are in place to prevent biosafety incidents (e.g., unintended personal exposure or release of an agent outside of containment) or biosecurity incidents (e.g., theft or intentional misuse of information, knowledge, products, or technology). Several past policies and frameworks have been key components of the federal oversight framework for research involving biological agents and toxins and have provided scientists, institutions, and federal funding agencies with valuable insight.

A new policy and implementation guidance for research involving Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) and Pathogens with Enhanced Pandemic Potential (PEPP) was released in May 2024.

Dual Use Research of Concern Oversight Policy Framework

 

Enhanced Potential Pandemic Pathogen Oversight Framework

 

Research Reviewed Under the HHS P3CO Framework

 

History of Research Oversight Policies

 

Personal Protective Equipment

Personal Protective Equipment

S3: Science Safety Security

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) is specialized clothing or equipment worn by an employee to provide protection against a hazard (e.g., infectious agents and toxins). General work clothes (e.g., uniform, pants, shirts, blouses) are not intended to function as protection against a hazard and are not considered to be PPE.

PPE can be as basic as eye protection (safety glasses or goggles), gloves, and a lab coat or as complex as a Biosafety Level 4 "positive pressure suit" that completely isolates the employee from the laboratory environment. The use of specific PPE required is determined through a risk assessment.

The characteristics of the infectious agent or toxin being manipulated and the type of laboratory procedures performed will determine the type of PPE required. If there is a risk of creating an infectious biological aerosol (suspension of very fine particles or droplets in the air), use of the proper respirator will prevent the worker from inhaling the infectious aerosol. This work can also be conducted in a biosafety cabinet to contain any aerosols created.

Personal Protective Equipment Terms

Term Definition 
Aerosol 
 

Describes microscopic droplets that may contain infectious agents or toxins, similar to the droplets produced by a sneeze or a cough. Some laboratory procedures including sonication, centrifugation, vortexing, flow cytometry, fluorescence-activated cell sorting (FACS) and homogenization can produce aerosols. These procedures should only be performed within a primary containment device. More information on aerosols is available from CDC.

Mucous Membrane and Respiratory Protection

Protective devices that are worn by the user to reduce or eliminate exposure to infectious materials (e.g., inhaling particles or liquid sprays). Such devices include surgical masks and face shields that protect mucous membranes against exposures from liquid droplets, dual and single cartridge half-mask and full-face respirators, gas masks, powered air-purifying respirators, supplied-air respirators, and self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBA). Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories includes guidance on the type of mucous membrane and respiratory protection that may be required for work conducted with infectious agents or toxins. CDC issues guidance for work with new or emerging agents or toxins, which frequently includes information about respiratory protections.

Sharps

Needles or other sharp instruments capable of breaking the skin. 
 

Gloves

Designed to protect hands from contact with potentially hazardous materials (e.g., infectious agents and toxins or corrosive chemicals). Procedures for removing gloves to minimize contamination are taught in laboratories and some videos are available online. Gloves are made of different materials such as latex and nitrile. Nitrile gloves can be used by people who are allergic to latex.

Goggles and Safety glasses

Provide eye protection from splashes of chemicals or liquids containing infectious agents or toxins. Laboratory goggles and safety glasses should include shields on sides to prevent splashes at an angle from reaching the eye. For people who wear glasses, prescription goggles are available.

Lab Coats and Gowns

Protect skin and street clothing from potential hazards such as materials containing infectious agents or toxins and dangerous chemicals when working in a laboratory environment. Most lab coats can be washed and decontaminated. Gowns, on the other hand, are usually disposed of with other contaminated waste. 
PPE for work in a BSL-4 suit laboratory includes the use of a positive pressure suit connected to a HEPA filtered airline. The positive pressure suit completely isolates the laboratory worker from the laboratory environment, ensuring there is no contact with potentially hazardous material (e.g., infectious agents and toxins). Laboratory personnel who work in positive pressure suits require significant training. 
For more information on BSL-4 suits, see:

  • A section of this article discusses entry procedures for a BSL-4 laboratory. 

     

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards for Biological Laboratories

Occupational Safety and Health Administration Standards for Biological Laboratories

 

S3: Science Safety Security

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) issues guidelines to protect workers in all industries, including biological laboratories. All laboratory workers should be aware of the publications from OSHA related to biological laboratory safety including several regulations and guidance documents. OSHA also publishes Quick Facts sheets on specific pieces of equipment, such as centrifuges, which may also be of use to laboratory workers and administrators.

General Hazards

Personal Protective Equipment

More Information

For more information on the standards listed above, please see the OSHA Laboratory Guidance.

OSHA also maintains a topic page on laboratories, which includes Quick Facts on many other topics relevant to biological laboratories.

Safety Equipment

Safety Equipment

S3: Science Safety Security

Biosafety Cabinets

 

Personal Protective Equipment

 

Facility Design

 

Safety Equipment (Primary Barriers and Personal Protective Equipment)

The primary means of physical containment include laboratory practices and the use of containment equipment within the laboratory. Safety equipment includes biosafety cabinets (BSCs), personal protective equipment (PPE), enclosed containers, and other controls designed to remove or minimize exposures to hazardous biological materials.

Personal protective equipment is specialized clothing or equipment worn by laboratory workers to provide another layer of protection while handling infectious agents or toxins. PPE may include masks, gloves, safety glasses, lab coats or gowns, and other protective garments. The purpose of PPE is to prevent exposure of laboratory workers to infectious agents or toxins while in the laboratory. PPE is used in all biological laboratories and at all biosafety levels.

Biosafety Cabinets are primary containment devices designed to contain infectious agents or toxins. They are routinely used for a variety of applications such as cell and tissue culture, bacterial and viral work, and clinical sample manipulations. Biosafety cabinets (BSCs) are designed to protect laboratory workers and the environment from potential exposure to infectious agents or toxins through the use of directional air flow and High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters. BSCs can also protect a biological product from contamination.

Facility Design and Construction (Secondary Barriers)

The facility design and physical features of a biological laboratory provide primary barrier protection from the accidental release of infectious agents or toxins outside the laboratory or to the environment. The design and construction of the facility contribute to the laboratory workers' protection. It also provides a barrier to protect people, animals, and the environment outside of the laboratory from infectious agents or toxins that may be accidentally released from the laboratory. Examples of protective features in buildings include double doors and negative air pressure rooms. Laboratory design is one element of "engineering controls" used in laboratory biosafety.

Biosafety Innovation

Needles, centrifuges, glass instruments, and other tools can all pose unique hazards to laboratory workers. Over time, the design of this equipment has changed to improve safety and reduce risks. Biosafety innovation is an ongoing process of hazard identification and design changes to address new or newly recognized risks.

Safety advances in biological laboratories have been made in the design of new equipment and in standard laboratory practices based on new information about biological hazards. The proper use of equipment, adherence to standard operating procedures, and good practices in the laboratory are all crucial to keeping laboratory workers, the community, and the environment safe.

A few examples of the ways safety equipment can reduce a laboratory worker's risk of exposure are listed below and show how important well-designed equipment in laboratories is for ensuring safety.

Appendix: PHEMCE High-Priority Threats

Appendix: PHEMCE High-Priority Threats

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan 2024 

The U.S. continues to face a range of serious threats to its health security from naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate use of CBRN agents, as well as naturally occurring EIDs, including pandemic influenza.

PHEMCE High-Priority Threats

The PHEMCE will continue to address MCM needs to protect against high-priority threats. These may be determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security to pose a sufficient material threat to affect national security or determined by PHEMCE leadership to have the potential to threaten national health security. The PHEMCE high-priority threats are (in alphabetical order by threat area):

Biological Threats

  • Bacillus anthracis (anthrax)* and multidrug resistant B. anthracis (MDR anthrax)*

  • Burkholderia mallei (glanders)* and Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis)*

  • Clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism)*

  • Ebolavirus (Ebola hemorrhagic fever)*

  • Emerging infectious diseases

  • Francisella tularensis (tularemia)*

  • Marburgvirus (Marburg hemorrhagic fever)*

  • Pandemic influenza virus

  • Rickettsia prowazekii (typhus)*

  • Severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronavirus (SARS-CoV) (including SARS-CoV-1 and -2)*

  • Variola virus (smallpox)*

  • Yersinia pestis (plague)* 
     

Chemical Threats

  • Acetylcholinesterase inhibitor nerve agents*

  • Chlorine

  • Cyanide salts (potassium and sodium cyanide)*

  • Hydrogen cyanide*

  • Pharmaceutical based agents (including opioids)*

  • Phosgene

  • Vesicants* 
     

Radiological and Nuclear* Threats

  • Radiological and nuclear agents* 
     

(*) Indicates an identified material threat under section 319F-2(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Public Health Service Act. 
 

 

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Conclusion

Conclusion

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan 2024


Public health, healthcare, and MCM preparedness are essential components of national health security. Without a strong domestic MCM enterprise, the nation remains vulnerable to an expanding list of naturally occurring, accidental, and deliberate threats. The above goals and objectives require extensive coordination among federal, SLTT, and public- and private-sector partners. This strategy and implementation plan are intended to promote readiness in the MCM enterprise by aligning efforts across the USG, assessing preparedness and response capabilities, supporting innovation, enhancing strategic partnerships, and strengthening last-mile distribution efforts.

The PHEMCE will continue to modernize its efforts to establish and maintain an improved state of MCM preparedness, track the execution of these priorities, and provide periodic updates through the PHEMCE governance structure and future iterations of the PHEMCE SIP. 
 

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2024 PHEMCE GOALS

2024 PHEMCE GOALS

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan 2024 
 
 

GOAL 1: Ensure the U.S. government has defined the right MCM capabilities to respond to future public health emergencies and disasters.

Up-to-date risk assessments of the current and evolving threat landscape are critical for preparedness and response planning, and decision-making. These assessments help identify the most critical CBRN, pandemic influenza, and other EID threats to national security and inform USG's MCM development and procurement. They also provide decision-makers with information needed to prioritize threats, support the capabilities needed to deploy and use MCMs effectively, and integrate available solutions into MCM preparedness and response.

ASPR collaborates with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to leverage risk assessments, as well as existing material threat determinations (MTDs), to establish Requirements that (a) assess capabilities, (b) identify gaps, (c) outline solutions, and (d) justify the timely allocation of resources. Such Requirements inform tradeoffs that balance existing resources and constraints and inform MCM procurement and sustainment decisions for both CBRN and emerging threats. To guide PHEMCE's evaluation and prioritization of MCMs, PHEMCE members will:

  • Objective 1.1 Conduct a comprehensive threat landscape review and update scenarios and modeling to inform Requirements.

    • Key Milestones:

      • 1.1.1 Continue annual threat briefing for PHEMCE member agencies.

      • 1.1.2 Conduct annual risk analysis that integrates updated intelligence and surveillance information on emerging and re-emerging threats.

      • 1.1.3 Leverage interagency expertise to review and update scenarios and models used to inform Requirements development for 25 percent of the threats each year.

  • Objective 1.2 Update Requirements for MCM-related activities, including stockpiling, to reflect current and emerging threats and operational plans.

    • Key Milestones:

      • 1.2.1 Leverage the current risk analysis to ensure that high priority threats are aligned with DHS's list of MTDs, such that as new threats emerge, new MTDs are added, as needed, and rescinded if certain threats wane. These determinations incorporate latest threat information and guide the MCM portfolio.

      • 1.2.2 Use current scenarios and models to finalize requirements for developing and acquiring MCMs and the capabilities required to use and monitor them.

      • 1.2.3 Ensure all populations, particularly vulnerable, at-risk, and historically underserved are considered in updated scenarios and models.

      • 1.2.4 Integrate updated Requirements and MTDs into the MCMPR report. 

  • Objective 1.3 Increase the visibility of current USG capabilities through the development of a comprehensive MCM database for federal partners (ensuring appropriate protections for information contained in the database), which outlines the status of products and technologies from the development pipeline through stockpiling.

    • Key Milestones:

      • 1.3.1 Ensure PHEMCE members have access to the latest information on products in the MCM pipeline, including how these address updated MTDs and Requirements.

      • 1.3.2 Establish and maintain a comprehensive database of available MCMs across all priority CBRN and emerging infectious disease threats. Database should capture the regulatory approval status for high-risk populations, including pregnant women and children.

GOAL 2: Drive unified action toward developing and sustaining priority MCMs aligned with key USG strategies. 

PHEMCE member agencies do not have access to the funds needed to fully support and sustain a robust MCM pipeline and capabilities that ensures full preparedness — from early research to delivery, utilization, and safety monitoring — necessary to meet the established Requirements for a holistic MCM enterprise. At the same time, the PHEMCE is addressing an increasing number of threats, including emerging infectious diseases, some of which do not have established MTDs. This growing gap in projected need versus available funding identified by the PHEMCE MYB makes it challenging for PHEMCE agencies to ensure our nation is best prepared to respond to future public health emergencies or disasters. A well-harmonized set of priorities across interagency partners is critical to ensuring all key stakeholders work together and maximize available resources. Guided by national strategies, including the National Health Security Strategy and National Biodefense Strategy and Implementation Plan for Countering Biological Threats, Enhancing Pandemic Preparedness, and Achieving Global Health Security (NBS), the PHEMCE pursues unified priorities balanced against existing resources. For example, the NBS's implementation plan calls for seven Joint Capabilities Plans (JCPs), many of which are specific to MCMs and relevant to the PHEMCE's scope. Where possible, the PHEMCE's approach is to prioritize broadly acting or threat-agnostic countermeasures, aligning to the goals of the JCPs, to ensure MCMs can be adapted and readily scaled to address novel emerging threats. To this end, the PHEMCE members will:

  • Objective 2.1 Conduct routine USG MCM portfolio reviews to ensure coordinated action (and avoid duplication) across partners, departments, and agencies.

    • Key Milestones

      • 2.1.1 Leverage the MCM database (see Objective 1.3) to conduct a comprehensive PHEMCE-wide portfolio review and identify critical gaps and inefficiencies.

      • 2.1.2 Establish a regular review cadence to ensure the portfolio stays up-to-date and aligned with key priorities.

      • 2.1.3 Promote information sharing with key international partners to improve the global preparedness posture. 

  • Objective 2.2 Identify the most critical capability gaps and priorities across MCM development, including platform technologies and threat-agnostic approaches.

    • Key Milestones: 

      • 2.2.1 Identify opportunities for collaboration among priority areas for research and development, from discovery through approval and sustainment. Given limited funds, these priorities will be weighed against existing priorities to minimize risk. 

      • 2.2.2 Identify opportunities for development activities to leverage flexible technologies that can adapt more easily to novel, unknown threats.

      • 2.2.3 Identify in advance regulatory mechanisms to support medical product use in identified populations at risk. 

      • 2.3.4 Coordinate across interagency partners and maximize resources for the development and use of emerging technologies.

  • Objective 2.3 Leverage USG plans to develop critical MCM capabilities.

    • Key Milestones: 

      • 2.3.1 Leverage development of Requirements, stakeholder engagements, lessons learned initiatives, table-top exercises, and/or other mechanisms or policy initiatives to update or refine USG plans and policies, including the JCPs. 

      • 2.3.2 Identify opportunities to coordinate planning exercises to ensure appropriateness of proposed plans and policies.

      • 2.3.3 Identify innovative approaches to develop MCM capabilities.

      • 2.3.4 Ensure PHEMCE partners share MCM-related strategic plans, playbooks, or other relevant guiding documents to support communication and cross-collaboration.

      • 2.3.5 Incorporate development of new initiatives into PHEMCE's MYB to track and forecast budget needs. 

GOAL 3: Optimize and strengthen collaborations with stakeholders.

An effective MCM enterprise is contingent on close coordination and collaboration among all partners. 

As required in statute, PHEMCE member agencies routinely engage with non-federal partners. With SLTT public health departments and officials, these occur via routine engagement from ASPR regional offices, formalized webinars, and targeted partnerships and from CDC emergency management, epidemiology, laboratory, clinical and state and local staff who engage with epidemiologic, laboratory, healthcare and regulatory partners. With industry partners, PHEMCE engages via market research, new and existing partnerships, and targeted solicitations. These mechanisms, among others, were actively utilized during recent response efforts and are continuously assessed for improvement opportunities. The PHEMCE will also continue to improve coordination and collaboration between federal and non-federal partners and:

  • Objective 3.1 Enhance collaboration between federal and non-federal (e.g., industry and nonprofit, SLTT, pharmacies, and healthcare systems) partners to improve engagement for effective MCM decision-making and use.

    • Key Milestones:

      • 3.1.1 Finalize a PHEMCE stakeholder engagement strategy for engaging non-federal partners, leveraging existing available channels, and developing new mechanisms to fill gaps.

      • 3.1.2 Ensure quarterly engagement with industry partners through appropriate channels.

      • 3.1.3 Ensure regular engagement among federal partners through appropriate channels.

      • 3.1.4 Conduct targeted outreach on specific topics identified and prioritized by PHEMCE members and stakeholders.

      • 3.1.5 Leverage existing cooperative agreements that can support partnership building and collaboration.

  • Objective 3.2 Identify and develop resources or tools to support collaboration with relevant partners. Tools should improve how MCMs are developed, manufactured, sustained, distributed, used, or monitored for safety and effectiveness.

    • Key Milestones: 

      • 3.2.1 Identify existing tools used across interagency partners for MCM training, deployment, data collection (such as safety and real-world effectiveness monitoring), and guidance development.

      • 3.2.2 Develop a new resource or tool for coordinated partner engagement.

      • 3.2.3 Integrate external feedback into development of resources or tools. 

GOAL 4: Strengthen last-mile MCM access efforts to enable a more coordinated and equitable MCM response to a future public health emergency or disasters. 

MCM preparedness efforts are only successful if products are able to be used when they are needed by those who need them the most. This requires a concerted effort among key federal and non-federal partners on MCM dispensing, distribution, and administration, including safety and effectiveness monitoring, paying particular attention to challenges faced by vulnerable individuals and underserved communities disproportionately impacted by public health emergencies and disasters. Lessons learned from COVID-19 and mpox provide opportunities to improve last-mile MCM capabilities. The PHEMCE will incorporate recent lessons into USG preparedness efforts to ensure a more coordinated and equitable MCM response during future public health emergencies or disasters. To strengthen last-mile efforts, the PHEMCE members will:

  • Objective 4.1 Identify last-mile MCM dispensing, distribution, and administration lessons from COVID-19 and mpox, capitalizing on preserving capabilities built during responses and new capabilities that need to be established.

    • Key Milestones:

      • 4.1.1 Review existing after-action and lessons-learned reports from recent response efforts as well as trainings and exercises. Examples include but are not limited to COVID-19 and mpox. Identify areas of improvement for MCM use that may be addressed by guidance development.

      • 4.1.2 Leverage collaborative tools (Objective 3.2) to engage key federal and non-federal partners on MCM dispensing, distribution, and administration issues experienced during response efforts.

  • Objective 4.2 Ensure lessons are incorporated into appropriate HHS plans, including product development, acquisition, and stockpiling efforts. 

    • Key Milestones: 

      • 4.2.1 Collaborate with interagency partners on developing response plans, as appropriate, to align last-mile roles and responsibilities and reduce duplication of efforts. Where possible, plans should include triggers for release of products. 

      • 4.2.2 Develop data-driven tools to address last-mile dispensing and administration and safety monitoring efforts. 

      • 4.2.3 Share collected distribution lessons learned with stakeholders, as appropriate.

      • 4.2.4 Where relevant, incorporate last-mile lessons learned into product research and development efforts. 

  • Objective 4.3 Consider MCM needs across ALL populations — focusing on vulnerable, at-risk, and historically underserved communities — to improve equitable deployment and access to MCMs.

    • Key Milestones: 

      • 4.3.1 Review research and development portfolios as well as stockpiled MCMs to identify data gaps, including clinical studies, to address the needs of vulnerable individuals and underserved communities.

      • 4.3.2 Integrate existing efforts analyzing vulnerable and medically fragile populations into planning and response efforts.

      • 4.3.3 Coordinate updates to guidance documents incorporating new information, including lessons learned from recent response efforts.

      • 4.3.4 Identify mechanisms to collect and inform product access and use across underserved communities.

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Recent Accomplishments 

Recent Accomplishments 

Public Health and Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise Strategy and Implementation Plan 2024
 

Leveraging federal and non-federal partners, the PHEMCE made progress toward the three previously established goals in the 2022 SIP. The accomplishments below, achieved throughout 2022 and 2023, informed vital decisions that strengthened the MCM enterprise:

  1. Identified needs to protect Americans against current and emerging threats. 
    2022 was a critical year for continuing to reconstitute the PHEMCE infrastructure and ensuring the PHEMCE meets the statutory requirements set forth by the PHS Act. In 2022, the PHEMCE aligned on MCM goals and funding availability. The PHEMCE established critical processes, such as business rules and mechanisms for information sharing, integral to PHEMCE's ability to make recommendations. Next, the PHEMCE reviewed all existing Requirements and made recommendations to retire, update, or validate existing models and the Requirements on which they are based. In parallel, PHEMCE responded to emerging MCM-related issues in Ukraine as well as the mpox outbreak. 

    In 2023, the PHEMCE conducted threat horizon scans to assess emerging threats and associated risks to determine whether Requirements need to be updated. Importantly, because these activities drive many technical discussions across interagency partners, they included subject matter experts and decision-makers to ensure the enterprise is aligned on the PHEMCE's highest priorities. While the threat landscape analysis did not significantly shift the portfolio, the PHEMCE members recognized the importance of emerging pandemic threats to national security. Because these emerging pandemic threats pose risk to national security, the PHEMCE will take steps to recognize, assess, and prioritize them in addition to CBRN threats already in the PHEMCE mission. The PHEMCE also reviewed and made recommendations for four updated Requirements, which incorporate lessons learned from the COVID-19 and mpox responses, update the scenarios that drive Requirements setting, and update capabilities based on recent learnings to ensure the USG is prepared for the next public health emergency. 
    Additionally, the PHEMCE: 
     

  • Expanded its membership to include the newly established White House OPPR as a PHEMCE co-chair to provide policy perspectives and ensure alignment between PHEMCE efforts and overall USG strategies and priorities for pandemic preparedness and biodefense.

  • Initiated portfolio assessments to identify gaps in MCM preparedness, including for EIDs. While PHEMCE agencies have already been investing in EIDs, in 2024 and beyond PHEMCE will build on these efforts to conduct detailed appraisals of needs to address these threats across the MCM space.

  • Developed strategies to address identified gaps and assess opportunities for continuous improvement. 
    In 2023, the PHEMCE took important steps to align and extend collaboration with SLTTs, the private sector, non-governmental organizations, the broader MCM community, and international partners. Outreach included engaging via public meetings, hosting webinars, and connecting with partners in topic-focused conversations. These efforts increased transparency into PHEMCE operations, collected lessons learned, and identified opportunities to improve collaboration. PHEMCE met with partners around the following topics: 

    • Increasing awareness around important emerging technologies, such as platform approaches and development pathways for threat agnostic products that should be on PHEMCE's horizon.

    • Understanding challenges SLTT partners face in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic response and opportunities to transform as we prepare for future emergencies.

    • Sharing best practices with international partners on Requirements setting, prioritization, and stockpiling processes. 

    In parallel with these outreach efforts, the PHEMCE conducted thorough assessments of the MCM budget landscape and reviewed the contents of the SNS, incorporating feedback from industry, SLTT, and other partners.

  • Provided recommendations to the HHS Secretary based on the best available evidence combined with situational awareness and field deployment realities. 
    The first two goals of the 2022 PHEMCE SIP highlighted how PHEMCE conducts day-to-day business, leveraging the best available evidence to coordinate, share information, and make recommendations that balance the evidence against real-world limitations. These recommendations are shared with the HHS Secretary through various venues, including: 
     

    • As part of the PHEMCE MYB, the PHEMCE outlined the near- and long-term priorities for MCM R&D, procurement, stockpiling, and replenishment. The MYB outlines funding priorities for HHS agencies to ensure the end-to-end MCM development cycle is efficient, innovative, and adaptive to emerging threats while accounting for budget limitations.

    • As part of a comprehensive SNS portfolio review, PHEMCE led the threat-based review of the SNS contents, taking stock of the portfolio of products, identifying gaps, and making recommendations. Such recommendations, captured in the MCMPR, account for updating the threat landscape and Requirements as needed, capturing advances in R&D and advanced product development, and feedback from relevant stakeholders. 

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